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ABSTRACT 
CEO learning theory suggests that by completing more acquisitions and improving bidding skills, 
CEO completes the prospective bid more successfully. This paper tests the CEO’s learning process 
in acquisition programs. Empirical evidence uncovers a positive relation between CEO’s 
accumulated learning experience and the takeover probability of success. And the effect of CEO 
learning on transaction outcome remains economically and statistically significant after controlling 
for CEO’s inherent abilities. I also confirm that CEO listens to the market reactions when making 
acquisition decisions, but the effect of listening during acquisition is lower when CEO is more 
experienced. Importantly, the cross-section analysis of deal announcement returns and bid 
premiums suggests that CEOs tend to select deals that create more wealth to shareholders and pay 
higher premium to takeover targets when they have higher levels of experience.   
JEL: G34 
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1. Introduction 
Academic literature frequently discusses the central role of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) 
in merger and acquisition (M&A) process. CEO’s personal characteristics have been recognized 
as important determinants of firms’ management style (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Kaplan, 
Klebanov, & Sorensen, 2012), especially in the management of large investments such as M&As 
(Bao & Edmans, 2011; Custodio & Metzger, 2013; Park, 2003; Yim, 2013).  CEOs are believed 
to learn during the process of making serial acquisitions (Aktas, de Bodt, & Roll, 2009, 2011, 
2013; Kau, Linck, & Rubin, 2008; Luo, 2005). Intuitively, they draw more accurate inferences 
about takeover targets based on experience gained from previously completed transactions, and as 
a result, they complete potential bids successfully and profitably (Aktas et al., 2009).  
CEO gains different sources of benefits when takeover bids succeed, such as fame (Avery, 
Chevalier, & Schaefer, 1998), empire building or compensation (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004). They 
also face threats of being disciplined for undertaking poor quality bids (Lehn & Zhao, 2012) and 
failing to acquire desired takeover targets. For example, Ed Krell, who has been the CEO of 
Destination Maternity for over a decade, will be stepping down as the CEO of the maternity and 
kid’s wear retailer after a sequence of failed attempts to take over Mothercare.3 Zurich Insurance’s 
chief, Martin Senn, has resigned under pressure of  the failed takeover of Britain's RSA and 
stumbling performance in its core business.4 Electrolux reports that its Chief Executive Keith 
                                                
3 Strydom, Martin “Ed Krell quits as Destination Maternity chief after failed Mothercare approach 
and profits warning.” The Telegraph, August 11, 2014, Business. 
4 Armstrong, Ashley. “Zurich Insurance chief executive Martin Senn steps down”. The Telegraph, 
December 1, 2015, Business.  
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McLoughlin will be forced to step down after the Swedish company's bid to take over the appliance 
division of General Electric failed. 5  Strict penalties and appealing compensation packages 
motivate CEO to learn and complete potential transactions.  
Empirical investigation of CEO learning in M&A process is challenging because its associated 
influence is not directly observable; it is a latent variable in econometric modelling. To overcome 
this problem, I utilize the CEO learning model of Aktas et al. (2009) in the context of serial 
acquisitions. The model assumes that financial market reflects investor reactions in stock price 
during the announcement of M&A transactions. CEO receives such feedback and revises his own 
prediction about potential synergies with other targets. Given that CEO learns from completed 
transactions through market feedback, the model indicates a positive relation between the number 
of previously consummated transactions, which represents CEO’s accumulated learning 
experience (ALE), and the outcome of prospective transactions. 
In order to capture the effect of CEO learning on the takeover probability of success, I examine 
CEOs who announce serial transactions, i.e., acquisition programs at firm-CEO level. This sample 
of multiple transactions allows us to hold characteristics of the acquirer constant while examining 
the effect of CEO’s accumulated learning experience on the outcome of takeover transactions. We, 
therefore, can infer the causal relation between CEO learning and transaction outcome without 
being affected by the new information from the acquirer. 
I collect a sample of 2785 serial transactions during the period 1992-2012. Probit regressions 
uncover a positive and statistically significant relation between CEO learning and the takeover 
                                                
5 Chopping, Dominic and Zander, Christina. “Electrolux CEO Keith McLoughlin Quits A Month 
After Collapse of GE Deal.” The Wall Street Journal, January 11, 2016, Business.  
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probability of success. Specifically, holding all other factors at mean, the likelihood of success 
increases 29% when CEO’s accumulated learning experience increases from zero to five. I 
separate the effect of CEO learning from CEO competence by decomposing the outcome of the 
first transaction of acquisition programs into predicted success and success residuals which 
represent a proxy for CEO’s unobservable competence. Empirical evidence shows that CEO 
competence is an important determinant of transaction outcome; however, it does not affect the 
significant effect of CEO learning. I also confirm the learning during acquisition hypothesis that 
CEO listens to the market reactions when making a takeover decision. However, the positive effect 
of deal announcement returns on transaction outcome is lower when CEO has a higher level of 
experience. 
Additional analyses of deal announcement return and bid premium suggest that CEOs tend to 
pay higher premium to takeover targets and select deals that create more synergy wealth when they 
more experienced. Specifically, CEO pays 1,2%(0.5%) more premium to the prospective target 
when he completes one more transaction. This finding supports the learning theory that CEO bids 
more accurately after completing more transactions, as a result, he pays higher premium to the 
target due to its lower valuation risk. In addition, as ALE increases by one, the total cumulative 
abnormal returns of the target and the acquirer around the announcement date increase by 
0.7%(0.3%), suggesting that higher experienced CEOs choose deals that generate higher synergy.  
I contribute to the literature of M&A in three aspects. Firstly, I identify the influence of CEO’s 
accumulated learning experience on the outcome of prospective transactions by testing the 
empirical prediction of Aktas et al. (2009)’s model. I support the channel through which CEO 
improves the transaction success by analyzing bidding premiums. Secondly, I separate the effect 
of CEO learning from the effect of CEO’s unobservable competence which can also cause the 
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persistence of success in acquisitions programs. Thirdly, literature documents two types of 
learning, learning during acquisition (Kau et al., 2008; Luo, 2005) and learning from past 
acquisitions (Aktas et al., 2009, 2011, 2013; Hayward, 2002). These two types of learning can 
simultaneously affect the transaction outcome. I, therefore, distinguish the latter from the former 
by employing the empirical approach of Luo (2005) to control for deal announcement returns.   
I organize the remaining part of the paper as follows. I present the review of literature and 
hypothesis development in Section 2. In Section 3, I describe econometric modeling and sample 
selection procedure. Section 4 provides main empirical results. Various robustness tests are 
conducted in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
2. Literature review 
2.1 Determinants of takeover success 
Following M&A literature, I identify a set of target characteristics that affect the transaction 
outcome including target size (Ambrose & Megginson, 1992; Baker, Pan, & Wurgler, 2012; 
Comment & Schwert, 1995; Luo, 2005; Palepu, 1986), bidding premium (Heron and Lie, 2006, 
2015), sales growth rate (Comment & Schwert, 1995; Field & Karpoff, 2002; Schwert, 2000; 
Sokolyk, 2011), leverage (Daines, 2001; Schwert, 2000; Sokolyk, 2011), similar industry 
classification (Flanagan, D'Mello, & O'Shaughnessy, 1998; Henry, 2004). 
Deal characteristics also affect the takeover probability of success. Specifically, the deterrence 
effect of takeover defense tactics is consistently identified (Ambrose & Megginson, 1992; Field & 
Karpoff, 2002; Sokolyk, 2011). In addition, competition from other bidders is likely to reduce the 
probability of success (Flanagan et al., 1998; Holl & Kyriazis, 1997; Walkling, 1985). However, 
tender offer strategy effectively increases the takeover probability of success (Baker et al., 2012; 
Bates & Lemmon, 2003; Betton, Eckbo, Thompson, & Thorburn, 2014; Kau et al., 2008). 
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Financing structure of the deal is also identified as an important determinant of the transaction 
outcome (Baker et al., 2012; Luo, 2005; Sokolyk, 2011). Some authors examine the importance of 
market reactions in the CEO’s decision process to complete a takeover transaction (Kau et al., 
2008; Luo, 2005). To my knowledge, the effect of CEO learning from past acquisitions remains 
unexplored. 
2.2 Review of CEO learning in M&A context 
The learning-by-doing terminology refers to the hypothesis that accumulated work experience, 
especially the repetition of the same type of action, improves workers’ productivity and adds to 
technical knowledge. According to the management literature, CEO of acquiring firms has abilities 
to learn from past acquisition experience (Harding & Rovit, 2004; Hayward, 2002). By completing 
takeover transactions, CEO forecasts the potential synergy of prospective deals more precisely, 
and targets turn to be less risky (Aktas et al., 2009). Deighton (2006) finds that CEO bids more 
accurately when he has higher levels of experience, i.e., the CAR’s variance significantly falls 
from deal to deal.  
Researchers postulate two types of CEO learning in M&A process. The first type is learning 
from past transactions. Hayward (2002) supposes that the relationship between the current 
acquisition’s performance and similarities of its businesses with the prior acquisition’s businesses 
shows an inverted-U shape. According to the hypothetical inverted-U shape, Aktas et al. (2013) 
derive a theoretical model predicting that under experience building curve, the time between deals 
strictly decreases with deal orders while under memory loss effect, elapses between consecutive 
deals increase significantly. Using a massive data set, they show evidence of CEO learning through 
repetitive acquisitions, especially when successive deals share significant similarities. In addition, 
Aktas et al. (2009) theoretically predict that CEO’s past experience has a correlation with his 
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current experience. Aktas et al. (2011) then empirically find that price premium or short-run CARs 
of the previous deal positively relates to the CARs of the current deal.  
The second type of CEO learning is learning during the acquisition process. This type of 
learning refers to CEO who listens to the response of outsiders and decides whether a transaction 
should be consummated. Luo (2005)’s model implies that if CEO acts in the interests of 
shareholders, when stock market reacts positively, the transaction will be completed. He then uses 
the aggregate stock returns of both target and acquirer as an explanatory variable for the transaction 
outcome. Kau et al. (2008) confirm that managers listen to the market when making major 
investment decisions, although they only use bidders’ returns. They show that managers’ 
propensity to learn is high when their interests are aligned with stockholders. 
My paper is different from Aktas et al. (2011) in the sense that it concentrates on the takeover 
likelihood of success to test the learning theory of Aktas et al. (2009) rather than focusing on the 
serial correlation of acquisition premiums. In addition, my paper examines  CEO’s accumulated 
learning experience rather than the learning during acquisition period identified by Luo (2005) and 
Kau et al. (2008), and the learning by observing hypothesis of Francis, Hasan, Sun, and Waisman 
(2014) in that observing actions of other acquiring peers will help firms make better acquisition 
decisions and create values to shareholders.   
2.3 CEO learning model 
The CEO learning model of Aktas et al. (2009) presumes that financial market reflects investor 
reactions in stock price during the announcement of acquisition transactions. CEO gains 
experience from such signals and subsequently updates his bidding strategy. Particularly, CEO 
receives market feedback and revises his predictions about the synergistic value with other 
takeover targets. I define !", the number of previously completed deals (from time 0 to time # −
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1), as accumulated learning experience.  CEO forecasts more accurately about the synergy of 
prospective acquisitions after completing more transactions, asymptotically, the variance of 
synergy, &',") , decreases when !"  increases. I define: 
 &',") = 1&',+) + !" 1&-) ./ (1) 
where &-) is the variance of the signals received from the financial market. Taking derivation 
of &',")  with respect to !", we have: 
 
	 012,34053 = − /12,64 + !" /174 .) /174 < 0 (2) 
The probability of success of :;<= =  >? (:;<=  wining a bid) = 	>? :;<=	valuation >:;<B	valuation 	 = 		CD::EF∗ H=∗ H=∗ , where CD::EF∗ H=∗ H=∗  is the distribution of :;<B′J 
reservation value,	HB∗, conditional on :;<=’s reservation value. KEF H=∗ H=∗  is the corresponding 
density function.  
The probability of winning the competition with respect to !"	is:  
 LCD::EF∗ H=∗ H=∗  L!" = KEF H=∗ H=∗ LH=∗L&',") L&',")L!"  (3) 
One direct result from the optimal H=∗: 
 LH=∗L&',") < 0 (4) 
The intuition behind Equation 4 is that for a risk averse CEO, when the perceived variance of 
his expected bonus increases, his reservation value will decrease. In other words, CEO pays higher 
price for a takeover target when the valuation risk of the bid is low. 
From (2), (4) and 	KEF H=∗ H=∗ > 	0, 	Equation 3 implies: 
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 LCD::EF∗(H=∗|H=∗) L!" > 0 (5) 
Equation 5 proposes that the number of previously completed transactions (ALE) positively 
influences the likelihood of success of the prospective bid, and this theoretical relation can be 
tested in the context of repetitive acquisitions at firm-CEO level. 
3. Methodology and sample selection 
3.2 Econometric modelling 
I employ a binary bivariate probit model to specify the functional relationship between the 
probability of success, CEO learning, and target and deal characteristics. I model the underlying 
transaction outcome as a linear function of CEO’s learning experience and other explanatory 
variables:  
 CD::="∗ = P!=" + Q="R + S=",  (6) 
where !=" represents CEO’s accumulated learning experience. Q=" is a set of variables representing 
deal and target characteristics. S=" is assumed to have a standard normal distribution.  
Although CD::="∗  is unobservable, the bidding outcome is fully observed. I define CD::="	as  
CD::=" = 1	TK	CD::="∗ > 00, 	U#ℎW?XTJW   
I utilize the binary probit model to estimate the probability of success: 
 >?UY=" = >?U CD::=" = 	Z(P!=" + Q="β) (7) 
in that P reflects the effect of CEO learning on the takeover probability of success.  
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3.2 Sample selection 
I follow Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Billett and Qian (2008), and Antonio, Rau, 
and Aris (2013) to collect a sample of repetitive acquisitions announced by U.S. acquirers during 
the period 1992-2012. I require that both targets and acquirers are public firms. I drop all firms 
operated in financial and utility industry.6 I then exclude all deal duplications identified by deal 
number in the SDC database. In order to identify acquisition programs at firm-CEO level, I match 
the acquisition database with the ExecuComp database using company identifier, CUSIP. 
Specifically, I first merge the SDC database with CRSP daily database using announcement dates 
and historical CUSIP, i.e., NCUSIP to identify CUSIP and PERMNO identifier. Subsequently, I 
match the merged dataset with ExecuComp database. 
I define an acquisition program as CEO announces at least two transactions within five years, 
starting from the first deal. I exclude all programs that belong to the period 1992-2012 and have 
transactions between 1990-1992 and 2012-2014.  After cleaning data, I obtain a comprehensive 
sample of 2785 observations which belong to 844 acquisition programs, spanning the period 1992-
2012. I also keep the remaining sample of 1161 single transactions that do not belong to any 
programs in order to compute the industry year rate of success in Section 4. The description of all 
variables are shown in Appendix 1. I winsorize all continuous variables representing target 
characteristics at 1% and 99% to minimize the impact of outliners.  
Insert Table 1 here 
                                                
6 I classify bidders and targets into 48 industry portfolios defined by Fama and French (1997) based 
on 4-digit SIC codes. Definition of the industry groups can be retrieved from Kenneth French’s 
website. 
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Table 1 provides the sample distribution of takeover transactions announced during the period 
1992-2012 across year and industry. Column 3 shows that, M&A activity is intense during the 
period 1995-2000. Particularly, each year witnesses more than 200 transactions announced by 
serial bidders, and this intensity is consistent with the M&A wave recognized by Arikan and Stulz 
(2016). Of all transactions, a vast majority is announced by serial acquirers, which accounts for 
approximately 71% of all transactions. Table 1 also presents the distribution of top ten industries 
ranked by the number of transactions including Business Services, Insurance,  Electronic 
Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products, Chemicals, Computers, Retail, Medical Equipment, 
Machinery and Communication. The Business Services industry has the highest number of serials 
acquisitions which accounts for 8.24% of all transactions.  
Insert Table 2 here 
Table 2 compares statistics between the sample of single and serial transactions. It also presents 
the descriptive statistics of 1941 transactions that have information of historical CEO learning 
experience. About target characteristics, single transactions have deal size, on average, of 1022 
million (4309). Transactions conducted by serial bidders have similar size of 1143 million on 
average, but they show a substantially higher standard deviation of 5459 million. Single and serial 
bidders share similar sales growth rate of 17.5% and 19.3%, respectively. However, serial bidders 
target firms that have a high level of debts. Specifically, deals announced by serial bidders has a 
debt ratio of 0.51, while those firms targeted by single bidders has a debt ratio of 0.49. 
Serial bidders are less likely to diversify. Table 2 shows that 84% of bidders operate in similar 
industries with the target. Tender offer strategy is used more popularly by single bidders. 16% of 
single transactions receives a tender offer compared to the ratio of 13% in the sample of multiple 
transactions. 74% of serial acquisition is financed by cash. 46% of them is successfully completed, 
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and 5.5% adopts at least one defensive tactic against the acquirer, while 2.8% has more than one 
bidder. The sample that has complete information of CEO learning experience shows similar 
summary statistics with the sample of serial transactions.7  
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 3 summarizes the outcome of serial acquisitions according to different levels of CEO 
learning experience. It appears that the more deals CEO completes, the higher the unconditional 
probability of success is. CEO, who has no historical experience, has the unconditional probability 
of success of 32%, while CEO, who previously completes equal or more than five bids, has a 
success ratio of 82%. The steady increase of the completion rate across each level of ALE is 
consistent with the prediction of CEO learning theory. Remarkably, the success rate of serial 
bidders who have no experience is significantly lower than that of single bidders. 
4. Results 
4.1 CEO learning and takeover success 
Table 4 provides probit regressions of transaction outcome on ALE and other control variables 
representing firm-deal characteristics. The key explanatory variable, ALE, is the number of 
transactions CEO previously completes in acquisition programs. The dependent variable, SUCC, 
equals one if the transaction status is defined as “Completed” in the SDC M&A database. 
Definition of all control variables is shown in Appendix 1. My hypothesis predicts that ALE 
positively affects the success probability of M&A transactions, i.e., the more transactions CEO 
                                                
7 It is noted that of 844 programs, 844 transactions ranked 1st have missing information about 
CEO’s historical learning experience. 
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consummates, the more experience they gain, and the more likely that the prospective transaction 
is completed.  
Model 1 does not control for year and industry. Model 2 controls for year. Model 3 controls 
for industry. Model 4 controls for both year and industry. The coefficient of ALE in Model 1 is 
0.151 (0.027) and statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that CEO learning increases the 
takeover probability of success. This evidence coheres with the increase of completion ratio across 
levels of ALE shown in Table 3. In addition, the effect of ALE remains positive and statistically 
significant to the inclusion of year and industry despite a slight reduction in Model 2, 3, and 4. To 
understand the economic significance of ALE, I compute the marginal effect of all variables at 
means for Model 1 (see Appendix 2). It suggests that when ALE increases one, the predicted 
probability of success increases by 6%(1.1%), holding other factors at mean. Similar calculation 
also shows that the estimated difference is 29% when ALE changes from zero to five. Although, 
it is difficult to tell how this significant increase transfers into actual transaction outcome, the 
evidence strongly supports the CEO learning theory in that ALE positively affects the outcome of 
the prospective transaction.  
Insert Table 4 here 
As expected, Table 4 shows that the likelihood that a takeover is completed is higher if the offer 
premium increases. SIZE is statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that targets with larger size 
are less vulnerable to takeovers (Field & Karpoff, 2002). In addition, probit regressions indicate 
no evidence supporting the argument that targets add debts to avoid takeovers (Schwert, 2000). 
Tender offer strategy is identified as an effective method to increase the probability of success. 
However, defensive tactics effectively deter takeover attempts. Consistent with Luo (2005), I find 
a negative and statistically significant effect of cash on transaction outcome. In addition, 
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transactions within industries are less likely to be completed. This evidence suggests that anti-trust 
authorities may have special interests in preventing anti-competitive combinations. Alternatively, 
the target’s management board  might deter all bids that come from rivals because they already 
own sufficient knowledge to manage the target (Flanagan et al., 1998). Additional bidders for a 
given takeover target also reduce the likelihood that the current offer is close.  
4.2 CEO learning and competence 
From the empirical evidence in Table 4, we interpret the positive effect of ALE on the takeover 
probability of success as evidence of CEO learning from previous acquisitions. However, CEO’s 
inherent abilities could also generate persistence of success in acquisition programs. In order to 
differentiate between the effect of ALE and CEO competence, I utilize Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, 
and Scharfstein (2010)’s two-stage methodology. I decompose the success probability of the first 
transaction in acquisition programs into two parts. The first part is predicted by the observable 
firm-deal characteristics and industry year rate of success, and the second part is the remaining 
residuals (first-staged regression). The latter can be interpreted as a factor including CEO 
competence.  I then regress the outcome of the later transactions in acquisition programs on CEO 
learning and competence, as well as an interaction between them (second-staged regression).  
 Insert Table 5 here  
In order to estimate CEO competence, I first generate industry year rate of success (IYRS) as 
the average completion ratio of takeover transactions of each year and industry during the period 
1992-2012. It is noted that the first transaction in acquisition programs is properly excluded from 
the calculation of IYRS to prevent any sort of “hard-wiring relationship”. I regress the outcome of 
the first transaction in acquisition programs on the industry year rate of success and other target-
deal characteristics. The residuals of this regression are considered as an indirect measurement of 
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CEO competence (INABS). It represents a part of takeover success that cannot be explained by 
being involved in an easy takeover market or selecting right targets.  
Table 5 shows the estimation results of the first-staged and the second-staged regressions. 
Model 1 presents OLS estimation of the first transaction’s outcome with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. IYRS is negative and statistically insignificant. This means participating in an easy 
market with good timing skills does not increase the takeover likelihood of success. Model 2 
displays the output of the probit regression of SUCC on INABS, ALE and other control variables. 
INABS is positive and statistically significant at 1%, indicating that CEO competence is an 
important determinant of takeover success. However, the effect of the CEO learning experience 
remains positive and statistically significant, even after controlling for CEO competence. Model 3 
includes an interaction term between INABS and ALE to capture the effect of CEO learning 
conditional on different levels of competence. The interaction term of 0.113(0.093) is not 
statistically significant. In addition, the coefficient of ALE in Model 3 decreases slightly compared 
to that in Model 2; however, it remains statistically significant and strongly supports the CEO 
learning theory. 
4.3 Types of CEO learning 
Luo (2005) and Kau et al. (2008)  provide evidence that CEO decides to consummate a 
takeover transaction according to market reactions. In order to distinguish between this of CEO 
learning and learning from past experience, I employ the method of Luo (2005) to control for deal 
announcement returns (DCAR). DCAR is generated as the total cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) around the announcement date of both target and acquirer. This empirical strategy can 
properly exclude the probability-feedback that comes from investors’ forecasts about the outcome 
of the transaction. I compute CAR by adding up stock abnormal returns from day -1 to 1 (day 0 is 
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the announcement date).  Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference between normal returns 
and benchmark returns predicted from the market model of which parameters are estimated based 
on daily stock returns and CRSP value-weighted returns during the period of 252 trading days (-
262, -10). 
 Insert Table 6 here  
Model 1 in Table 6 indicates that DCAR is positive and statistically significant at 10%. This 
finding supports the learning during acquisition hypothesis that CEO consummates a deal when 
the outsiders react favorably to the deal announcement. Also noted that the effect of ALE remains 
positive and statistically significant after controlling for DCAR. Moreover, experienced CEO may 
be less likely to be affected by the abnormal response of the outsiders. In short, CEO depends less 
on the abnormal returns generated by the transaction announcement to make a completion decision 
when he is more experienced. I, therefore, add an interaction between deal announcement returns 
and CEO learning experience in Model 3. The interaction term (DCAR_ALE) is negative and 
statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that the effect of CEO learning during acquisitions is 
lower when he has a higher level of ALE. 
4.4 Bid premiums, deal announcement returns and CEO learning experience 
CEO learning theory suggests that the decreasing variance of CEO’s perception on synergy 
effects enables him to pay a higher price for the target, therefore increases the probability of 
completing the transaction (Aktas et al., 2009). In addition, learning improves the target selection 
skills of the CEO, and the subsequent deal becomes less risky and more valuable. I, therefore, 
examine the effect of CEO’s accumulated learning experience on the offer premium and the 
potential synergy of the prospective deal. I regress the takeover premium (PREMIUM) and deal 
announcement returns (DCAR) on ALE and other firm-deal characteristics. PREMIUM is the ratio 
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between the offer price and target stock price four weeks prior to the announcement date, minus 
one. DCAR is defined as in the previous subsection. The coefficient of CEO learning experience 
in Model 1, Table 7 is positive and statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that when CEO 
completes one more takeover transaction, he pays 1.2%(0.5%) more premium to the takeover 
target. In addition, Model 2 shows a statistically significant and positive relation between CEO’s 
experience and the deal announcement returns. Specifically, when ALE increases by one, the total 
cumulative abnormal returns of the target and the acquirer around the announcement date increase 
by 0.7%(0.3%).  
 Insert Table 7 here  
5 Robustness checks 
5.1 Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Econometricians warn us about the “cluster problem” (Gibbons & Hedeker, 1994). CEO within 
acquisition programs have characteristics that could cause the persistence of success in acquisition 
programs. Estimating probit models without corrections for the correlation of the error terms will 
lead to imprecise results because the standard errors of the coefficients are biased (Guilkey & 
Murphy, 1993). I, therefore, set up a panel data with two dimensions of CEO identifier and deal 
orders. I then use random-effects probit models to control for the unobserved effects. Model 1 in 
Table 8 provides estimation results of the random-effects probit models. The likelihood ratio test 
does not reject the null hypothesis that the pool estimator is the same as the panel estimator at 1% 
significance level. In addition, the coefficient of ALE of 0.141(0.030) is statistically significant at 
1%, which strongly supporting the hypothesis that CEO learns from past experience.  
5.2 Alternative definition of acquisition program  
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It is possible that different definitions of acquisition program will affect the measurement of 
CEO learning and cause inconsistent results in predicting transaction outcome. A typical example 
is the Aktas et al. (2011)’s definition of acquisition program is a group of two successive 
transactions announced by the same firm and CEO. According to my baseline hypothesis with the 
new definition of acquisition program, the success of the prior transaction (PRSUCC) has a 
positive effect on the completion of the current transaction. Model 2 in Table 8 shows that 
coefficient of PRSUCC is 0.47 (0.08) and statistically significant at 1%, confirming that the effect 
of CEO learning is robust to the alternative of definition acquisition program. 
Insert Table 8 here 
5.3 Missing variables 
Although in Section 4.2, I control for CEO’s inherent abilities and firm-deal characteristics, 
CEO’s preferences and incentives indeed affect the transaction outcome (Agrawal & Walkling, 
1994; Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Grinstein & Hribar, 2004; Harford & Li, 2003). As a result, besides 
personal characteristics of CEO, such as tenure, gender, and age, I control for compensation factors 
including CEO pay slice (SLPAY), CEO variable pay (VRPAY) and CEO equity pay (EQPAY). 
SLPAY represents the relative ranking of the CEO’ compensation, and his abilities to extract rents 
(Bebchuk, Cremers, & Peyer, 2011); VRPAY and EQPAY control for the alignment between 
CEO’s wealth and the benefits of stockholders. Model 3 and 4 confirm the robust effect of CEO 
learning on transaction outcome. In Model 3, CEO’s personal characteristics including AGE, 
TENURE, and GENDER have no significant influence on the transaction outcome. EQPAY and 
SLPAY are also not statistically significant at 10%. However, Model 4 shows a positive but weak 
relation between VRPAY and the probability of success, suggesting that the higher alignment 
between CEO and shareholders, the greater efforts he spends to acquire potential targets.  
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5.4 CEO continuity 
CEO can be replaced and become CEO of other firms. The historical experience of doing 
acquisitions in one firm, therefore, can affect the learning in the other. I, therefore, track the 
identification of CEO in all acquisition programs. Subsequently, I search for the historical number 
of deals that CEO previously completes in other firms. I document that only seven CEOs have 
records of announcing M&As in other firms, and four of them complete at least one transaction. I 
do a probit regression which controls for the CEO’s historical experience in other firms. 
Specifically, I include a dummy indicator equal to one if CEO completes at least one takeover in 
the other firm. The effect of CEO learning experience, however, remains unchanged.8 
6 Conclusion 
Learning theory suggests that CEO accumulates experience from previously completed 
transactions and transfers it into completion of the prospective. In this paper, I model transaction 
outcome as a function of ALE and other firm-deal characteristics. I then collect a sample of 2785 
serial transactions announced between 1992 to 2012 from the SDC M&A database. Probit 
regressions identify a clear and significant relation between ALE and the outcome of takeover 
transactions. Specifically, the probability of success increases by 29% when ALE increases from 
zero to five, holding other factors at mean. In addition, CEO pays more premium to the takeover 
target when he is more experienced, which consistent with the hypothesis that CEO values the 
target higher when it becomes less risky. CEO competence significantly explains the persistence 
of success in acquisition programs, it does not affect the robustness of CEO learning effect. Probit 
                                                
8 In the interest of brevity, I do not present the estimation output of this probit regression because 
it is similar to the results presented in Table 4.  
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regressions reveal strong evidence supporting the effect of learning during acquisition; however, 
it is lower when CEO has a higher level of historical experience.  
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Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
 
 
 
 
Variable definition Source 
SUCC equals one if the transaction status is classified as “Completed” in the 
SDC database. 
SDC database 
VALUE is the value of transaction quoted in million dollars. SDC database 
PREMIUM equals the ratio between the offer price and target stock price four 
weeks before prior to announcement, minus one. 
SDC database 
SIZE is the natural logarithm of the transaction value. SDC database 
LEVER equals the ratio between the target’ total liabilities and its total assets. SDC database 
SALEGR equals the growth rate of sales in the most recent fiscal year. SDC database 
TENDER  is a binary indicator equal to one the acquirer launched a tender 
offer for the target. 
SDC database 
DEFENSE is a binary indicator equal one if the target employs at least one 
defensive tactic against the acquirer.  
SDC database 
CASH is a binary indicator equal to one if the transaction is 100% financed by 
cash. 
SDC database 
INDUS is a binary indicator equal to one if the target shares the same industry 
classification with the acquirer (Industry classification is based on 48 industry 
portfolios defined by Fama and French (1997)). 
SDC database 
COMPETE  is a binary indicator equal to one if there is more than one entity 
bidding for the target. 
SDC database 
GENDER is a binary indicator equal to one if CEO’s gender is male, and zero 
otherwise. 
ExecuComp 
TENURE is the period (years) holding CEO title in the acquirer.  ExecuComp 
AGE is the natural logarithm of CEO’s age.  ExecuComp 
EQPAY is the sum of CEO’s restricted stock grants and stock option grants 
scaled by his total compensation.  
ExecuComp 
VRPAY is generated as the difference between CEO’s total compensation and 
salary scaled by his total compensation.  
ExecuComp 
SLPAY is the proposition of CEO’s compensation as of the sum of the top-
five  executive team  (Bebchuk et al., 2011). 
ExecuComp 
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Appendix 2: Marginal effect 
The table shows the probit regression analysis of the transaction outcome and the corresponding 
marginal effect. I compute marginal effects for each continuous regressor as L; [ \ /L(\), and ∆;([|\) for each dummy indicator, evaluated at \ = \. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable SUCC=1 if transaction is completed, 0 otherwise 
 Probit regression  Marginal effect  
ALE 0.151a  0.060a 
 (0.027)  (0.011) 
PREMIUM 1.223a  0.488a 
 (0.130)  (0.052) 
SIZE -0.040c  -0.016c 
 (0.021)  (0.008) 
SALEGR 0.124  0.0493 
 (0.090)  (0.036) 
LEVER -0.249  -0.099 
 (0.160)  (0.064) 
TENDER (d) 1.568a  0.496a 
 (0.128)  (0.025) 
DEFENSE (d) -0.365b  -0.143b 
 (0.177)  (0.068) 
CASH (d) -1.364a  -0.478a 
 (0.099)  (0.027) 
INDUS (d) -0.866a  -0.320a 
 (0.119)  (0.038) 
COMPETE (d) -1.325a  -0.422a 
 (0.201)  (0.039) 
Year No  No 
Industry No  No 
N 1941  1941 
Standard errors in parentheses 
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
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Table 1: Distribution of M&A transactions 
Table 1 provides sample distribution of 2785 serial transactions announced during the period 1992-
2012 across year and industry. All acquirers are listed in the SDC M&A database and have CEOs 
identified in Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. Serial transactions are defined as 
transactions that belong to an acquisition program. Single transactions include all remaining 
transactions. The industry codes are classified as Fama and French (1997)’s 48 industry portfolios.  
 Single Serial ALE>=0 
Panel A: Distribution across year    
1992 2 3 0 
1993 22 59 13 
1994 73 141 51 
1995 69 220 111 
1996 67 293 184 
1997 82 266 173 
1998 112 318 248 
1999 96 277 206 
2000 72 208 169 
2001 45 133 101 
2002 35 87 64 
2003 39 85 65 
2004 37 102 82 
2005 58 100 79 
2006 54 87 61 
2007 60 101 79 
2008 81 102 78 
2009 25 63 52 
2010 46 51 44 
2011 40 63 55 
2012 46 26 26 
Panel B: Distribution across industry    
Business Services 136 325 219 
Insurance 61 198 148 
Electronic Equipment 86 187 125 
Pharmaceutical Products 45 153 118 
Chemicals 35 135 95 
Computers 35 133 97 
Retail 82 126 84 
Medical Equipment 34 116 82 
Machinery 51 98 60 
Communication 29 94 73 
Others 567 1220 840 
Total 1161 2785 1941 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics single and serial transactions during the period 1992-2012. Acquirers are listed in the SDC M&A 
database and have CEO identified in Standard and Poor’s ExecuComp database. All acquirers are publicly traded firms, and targets can 
be private, public or subsidiary. Serial transactions belong to acquisition programs which are constructed by acquirers who announce at 
least two transactions within five years. The remaining transactions belong to the sample of single transactions. All variables are defined 
in Appendix 1. a, b, and c denote statistically significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
 Single (a)  Serial (b)    ALE>=0 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median  Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median  
Mean 
difference 
(b-a)  Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median 
VALUE 1022 4309 133  1143 5459 156  121  1276 6107 189 
PREMIUM 0.164 0.317 0.069  0.154 0.359 0.046  -0.003  0.165 0.366 0.057 
SIZE 5.017 1.845 4.894  5.086 1.870 5.053  0.069  5.229 1.863 5.244 
SALEGR 1.175 0.383 1.094  1.193 0.432 1.097  0.018  1.192 0.438 1.093 
LEVER 0.494 0.237 0.496  0.508 0.229 0.514  0.013c  0.515 0.232 0.522 
CASH 0.722 0.448 1  0.744 0.436 1  0.023  0.742 0.438 1 
SUCC 0.438 0.496 0  0.460 0.498 0  0.021  0.464 0.499 0 
TENDER 0.158 0.365 0  0.132 0.339 0  -0.026b  0.150 0.357 0 
DEFENSE 0.050 0.218 0  0.055 0.227 0  0.005  0.055 0.227 0 
INDUS 0.869 0.337 1  0.842 0.365 1  -0.027b  0.828 0.377 1 
COMPETE 0.034 0.182 0  0.028 0.165 0  -0.006  0.029 0.167 0 
N 1161  2785    1941 
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Table 3: CEO learning and takeover success 
Table 3 summarizes the average success rate across levels of CEO learning experience (ALE). 
ALE equals the total number of transactions CEO previously completes in acquisition programs. 
Completion ratio is the ratio between the total number of completed transaction and the total 
number of transactions in each level of experience. A transaction is completed if its status in SDC 
M&A database is “Completed”. 
ALE Number of transactions Completed Failed Completion ratio 
0 724 231 493 32% 
1 690 335 355 49% 
2 254 142 112 56% 
3 130 78 52 60% 
4 56 44 12 79% 
>=5 87 71 16 82% 
Total 1941 901 1040 46% 
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Table 4: Probit models on completed and withdrawn transactions. 
Table 4 provides probit regressions of transaction outcome on CEO learning and other control variables representing firm-deal 
characteristics. The dependent variable, SUCC, equals one if the transaction is completed, and zero otherwise. ALE equals the total 
number of transactions CEO previously completes in acquisition programs. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. a, b, and c denote 
statistically significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively.  
 
 
 
Dependent variable SUCC=1 if transaction is completed, 0 otherwise 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 
Coefficient Standard error  
Coefficient Standard error  
Coefficient Standard error  
Coefficient Standard error 
ALE 0.151a 0.027  0.162a 0.028  0.126a 0.029  0.141a 0.030 
PREMIUM 1.223a 0.130  1.233a 0.132  1.194a 0.136  1.197a 0.137 
SIZE -0.040c 0.021  -0.046b 0.022  -0.050b 0.023  -0.056b 0.024 
SALEGR 0.124 0.090  0.104c 0.091  0.095 0.095  0.077 0.096 
LEVER -0.249 0.160  -0.281 0.165  -0.171 0.188  -0.182 0.192 
TENDER 1.568a 0.128  1.629a 0.132  1.648a 0.134  1.707a 0.137 
DEFENSE -0.365b 0.177  -0.335c 0.184  -0.361b 0.182  -0.347c 0.190 
CASH -1.364a 0.099  -1.453a 0.105  -1.394a 0.104  -1.504a 0.111 
INDUS -0.866a 0.119  -0.872a 0.121  -1.002a 0.129  -1.010a 0.133 
COMPETE -1.325a 0.201  -1.297a 0.201  -1.337a 0.208  -1.285a 0.208 
CONST 1.387a 0.232  2.275a 0.527  1.924a 0.332  2.698a 0.581 
Year  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Industry No  No  Yes  Yes 
N 1941  1941  1941  1941 
pseudo R-sq 0.41  0.43  0.44  0.46 
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Table 5: CEO learning experience and competence 
Table 5 presents two-stage regressions distinguishing the effect of CEO learning and competence on transaction outcome. Model 1 
shows the OLS estimation of the success of the first deal in acquisition programs on the industry rate of success (IYRS) and firm-deal 
characteristics. INABS is the estimated residuals in Model 1. Model 2 provides probit regression of the transaction outcome on ALE 
and INABS. Model 3 adds an interaction term between ALE and INABS as an explanatory variable. The dependent variable, SUCC, 
equals one if the transaction is completed, and zero otherwise. ALE equals the total number of transactions that CEO previously 
completes in acquisition programs. IYRS is the average completion rate of each year and industry. Other variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. a, b, and c denote statistically significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: SUCC=1 if transaction is completed, 0 otherwise 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Coefficient 
Robust 
standard 
error  
Coefficient Standard error  
Coefficient Standard error 
IYRS -0.056 0.056  - -  - - 
ALE - -  0.094a 0.037  0.090b 0.037 
INABS - -  0.418a 0.115  0.284c 0.159 
ALE_INABS - -  - -  0.113 0.093 
PREMIUM 0.239b 0.049  1.166a 0.146  1.153a 0.146 
SIZE -0.001 0.009  -0.034 0.026  -0.033 0.026 
SALEGR -0.057c 0.032  0.099 0.103  0.094 0.103 
LEVER -0.011 0.064  -0.127 0.207  -0.112 0.207 
TENDER 0.428a 0.050  1.746a 0.147  1.751a 0.147 
DEFENSE 0.024 0.058  -0.247 0.211  -0.237 0.211 
CASH -0.489a 0.041  -1.580a 0.119  -1.586a 0.119 
INDUS -0.143a 0.043  -1.083a 0.143  -1.087a 0.144 
COMPETE -0.290a 0.119  -1.335a 0.217  -1.330a 0.217 
CONST 0.982a 0.078  2.305a 0.748  2.262a 0.748 
Year No  Yes  Yes 
Industry No  Yes  Yes 
N 844  1702  1702 
R-sq/ pseudo R-sq 0.40  0.48  0.48 
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Table 6: Types of CEO learning 
Table 6 provides probit regressions of transaction outcome on different types of CEO learning. 
The dependent variable, SUCC, equals one if the transaction is completed, and zero otherwise. 
ALE equals the total number of transactions CEO previously completes in acquisition programs. 
DCAR is the total of cumulative abnormal returns between from day -1 to day 1 of both target and 
acquirer, with day 0 defined as the announcement date. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
a, b, and c denote statistically significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: SUCC=1 if transaction is completed, 0 otherwise 
 Model 1  Model 2 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
error Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
ALE 0.137a 0.031  0.210a 0.038 
DCAR 0.422c 0.243  1.056a 0.314 
DCAR_ALE - -  -0.453a 0.125 
PREMIUM 1.104a 0.159  1.170a 0.162 
SIZE -0.067a 0.026  -0.073a 0.026 
SALEGR 0.065 0.103  0.075 0.103 
LEVER -0.315 0.208  -0.320 0.209 
TENDER 1.887a 0.155  1.879a 0.156 
DEFENSE -0.163 0.206  -0.187 0.208 
CASH -1.565a 0.121  -1.564a 0.122 
INDUS -0.804a 0.146  -0.793a 0.147 
COMPETE -1.395a 0.237  -1.382a 0.238 
CONST 2.949a 0.641  2.902a 0.647 
Year Yes  Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes 
N 1764  1764 
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Table 7: Bid premium, deal announcement returns, and CEO experience 
Table 7 provides linear regressions of takeover premium and deal announcement returns on CEO’s 
accumulated learning experience. PREMIUM is the ratio between the offer price and target stock 
price four weeks prior to the announcement date, minus one. DCAR is the total of cumulative 
abnormal returns between from day -1 to day 1 of both target and acquirer, with day 0 defined as 
the announcement date. ALE equals the total number of transactions CEO previously completes 
in acquisition programs. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. a, b, and c denote statistically 
significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, respectively. 
      
Dependent variable PREMIUM (1)  DCAR (2) 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
error  Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
ALE 0.012b 0.005  0.007b 0.003 
SIZE 0.011b 0.005  0.001 0.003 
SALEGR 0.009 0.017  -0.002 0.011 
LEVER 0.047 0.035  -0.067a 0.022 
TENDER 0.213a 0.021  0.129a 0.014 
DEFENSE 0.153a 0.034  0.063a 0.022 
CASH -0.171a 0.019  -0.030b 0.013 
INDUS -0.169a 0.021  -0.114 0.015 
COMPETE 0.154a 0.044  -0.028c 0.032 
CONST 0.220b 0.108  0.232a 0.029 
Year Yes  Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes 
N 1941  1764 
R-sq 0.30  0.14 
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Table 8: Robust checks 
Table 8 provides various robust checks to unobserved heterogeneity, alternative definitions of acquisition program, and missing variables.  
The dependent variable, SUCC, equals one if the transaction is completed, and zero otherwise. Model 1 provides random-effects probit 
regressions of transaction outcome on CEO learning experience. Model 2 tests an alternative definition of acquisition program. Model 
3 and 4 control for CEO’s personal characteristics and compensation factors. ALE equals the total number of transactions CEO 
previously completes in acquisition programs. PRSUCC is a dummy indicator which equals one if the prior bid is completed in programs 
of two successive transactions, zero otherwise. AGE is the natural logarithm of CEO’s age. EQPAY is the sum of CEO’s restricted stock 
grants and stock option grants scaled by his total compensation. VRPAY is generated as the difference between CEO’s total 
compensation and salary scaled by his total compensation. SLPAY is the proposition of CEO’s compensation as of the sum of the top-
five executive team. Other variables are defined in Appendix 1. a, b, and c denote statistically significant at 1 %, 5 %, and 10 % level, 
respectively. 
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Dependent variable: SUCC=1 if transaction is completed, 0 otherwise 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
 Coefficient 
Standard 
error  Coefficient 
Standard 
error  Coefficient 
Standard 
error  Coefficient 
Standard 
error 
ALE 0.141a 0.030  - -  0.136a 0.031  0.135a 0.031 
PRSUCC - -  0.467a 0.078  - -  - - 
PREMIUM 1.197a 0.137  1.223a 0.137  1.196a 0.139  1.197a 0.139 
SIZE -0.056b 0.024  -0.043c 0.024  -0.050b 0.026  -0.062b 0.027 
SALEGR 0.077 0.096  0.084 0.096  0.053 0.101  0.033 0.101 
LEVER -0.182 0.192  -0.225 0.193  -0.195 0.197  -0.236 0.198 
TENDER 1.707a 0.137  1.696a 0.138  1.664a 0.140  1.668a 0.140 
DEFENSE -0.347c 0.190  -0.340c 0.189  -0.397b 0.193  -0.392b 0.193 
CASH -1.504a 0.111  -1.474a 0.111  -1.499a 0.114  -1.492a 0.115 
INDUS -1.010a 0.133  -1.058a 0.133  -1.000a 0.136  -0.993a 0.136 
COMPETE -1.285a 0.208  -1.337a 0.207  -1.303a 0.212  -1.277a 0.213 
AGE - -  - -  0.030 0.307  0.065 0.306 
TENURE - -  - -  -0.021 0.099  -0.038 0.099 
GENDER - -  - -  0.115 0.413  0.118 0.411 
EQPAY - -  - -  0.102 0.160  - - 
SLPAY - -  - -  0.105 0.145  0.038 0.146 
VRPAY - -  - -  - -  0.441b 0.211 
CONST 2.698a 0.581  2.559a 0.578  2.733c 1.463  2.573c 1.461 
Year Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
N 1941  1941  1839  1839 
pseudo R-sq -  0.46  0.45  0.45 
